

DD/A Registry

78-1290

27 MAR 1978

[redacted]
Executive Director
Interagency Classification Review Committee
National Archives Building
Seventh Street & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Mr. Wells:

Forwarded herewith are the Agency's final semi-annual reports for 1977 to the Interagency Classification Review Committee.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Executive Secretary
CIA Information Review Committee

Attachments: As stated

DDA/ISAS/RAB, [redacted] ad (30 January 1978)

Distribution:

- Orig - Adse w/2 atts
- 1 - OGC [redacted] w/att
- 1 - OS/PPG w/att
- 1 - DDA Subject (RAB) w/att
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - BTJ Chrono
- 1 - RAB Chrono

SEMIANNUAL
QUARTERLY SUMMARY REPORT
TO THE
INTERAGENCY CLASSIFICATION REVIEW COMMITTEE

1. PERIOD ENDING (Show day, month, year)

31 December 1977

INTERAGENCY REPORT
CONTROL NUMBER

1217-GSA-QU

2. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

Central Intelligence Agency

3. REFER QUESTIONS TO (Name and telephone number)

STAT

4. CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS (original, by authorized guide, or from extract or compilation) AND DECLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS (exclude reproduction copies)

CLASSIFICATION	ADVANCE DECLASSIFICATION CURRENT PERIOD SCHEDULE		GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION CURRENT PERIOD SCHEDULE		EXEMPT CURRENT PERIOD		TOTALS OF ALL DOCUMENTS	
	QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE
TOP SECRET	0	0	0	0	3529	6763	3529	6763
SECRET	0	1	7	12	3123	6180	3130	6193
CONFIDENTIAL	262	560	5	6	4630	8831	4897	9397
TOTALS	262	561	12	18	11282	21774	11556	22353

5. DESCRIBE EFFORTS TO INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS TO DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS (Attach exhibits or additional pages as necessary)

The above totals include only those documents in the Data Index, i.e., finished intelligence. In addition to the Data Index, a count was made of staff cable traffic and disseminated intelligence reports and cables produced by the Agency during CY 1977. Virtually all of these documents were exempt from the GDS. The count of disseminated intelligence reports and cables was made directly by classification level. The staff cable count was distributed to each classification level based on a sample of 5,000 cables. The totals for all the above documents, including the Data Index, for CY 1977 were:

Top Secret 7,100
Secret 445,761
Confidential 134,562

TOTAL 587,423

Note: Attached is an update sheet for Data Index submissions to this report for the previous reporting period. The Committee should correct its records to reflect the current figures.

6. SUBMITTED BY (Signature)

7. TITLE Executive Secretary
CIA Information Review
Committee

8. DATE

27 MAR 1978 STAT

SEMIANNUAL QUARTERLY SUMMARY REPORT TO THE INTERAGENCY CLASSIFICATION REVIEW COMMITTEE						1. PERIOD ENDING (Show day, month, year) 30 June 1977 Update		INTERAGENCY REPORT CONTROL NUMBER 1217-GSA-QU	
2. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Officers National Foreign Intelligence Board						3. REFER QUESTIONS TO (Name and telephone number)			
4. CLASSIFICATION ACTIONS (original, by authorized guide, or from extract or compilation) AND DECLASSIFICATION ASSIGNMENTS (exclude reproduction copies)									
CLASSIFICATION	ADVANCE DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		EXEMPT		TOTALS OF ALL DOCUMENTS		
	CURRENT PERIOD QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	CURRENT PERIOD QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	CURRENT PERIOD QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	CURRENT PERIOD QUARTER	YEAR TO DATE	
TOP SECRET	0		0		3234		3234		
SECRET	1		5		3057		3063		
CONFIDENTIAL	298		1		4201		4500		
TOTALS	299		6		10492		10797		
5. DESCRIBE EFFORTS TO INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS TO DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS (Attach exhibits or additional pages as necessary)									
6. SUBMITTED BY (Signature) <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px; margin-top: 5px;"></div>						7. TITLE Executive Secretary CIA Information Review Committee		8. DATE 27 MAR 1978 STAT	

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR MATERIAL
REPORT OF MANDATORY REVIEW ACTIONS

Interagency
Report Control No.
1222-GSA-QU

Dept. or Agency

Central Intelligence Agency
 Period Ending (Day, month, year)

31 December 1977

TOTALS		REQUESTS			PROCEDURAL ACTIONS				ACTION BY DEPARTMENT/AGENCY			WITHHOLDING AUTHORIZED BY FREEDOM OF INFO ACT	CARRYOVERS	
YEAR TO DATE	PERIOD CURRENT QUARTER	NUMBER CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS QUARTER PERIOD	NUMBER OF NEW REQUESTS RECEIVED	ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PAGES REVIEWED	NUMBER OF REQUESTS			NUMBER OF REQUESTS			TO NEXT QUARTER PERIOD		OVER 60 DAYS OLD	
					OPINION ONLY OR REFERRED TO OTHER AGENCY FOR FINAL ACTION	DISALLOWED		GRANTED IN FULL	GRANTED IN PART	DENIED IN FULL				
						PREMATURE REQUEST	INSUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY							UNDULY BURDENSOME
		164	238	4,200	35				51	131	55		130	29
			568	9,400	119				94	226	97			

Comments:

SUBMITTED BY (Signature)

TITLE

Executive Secretary,
Information Review Committee

Approved For Release 2007/07/17 : CIA-RDP86-00674R000100010011-9

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR MATERIAL

DEPARTMENT (or Agency)

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES

Central Intelligence Agency

Definition - An unauthorized disclosure is defined as a communication or physical transfer of classified information or material to an unauthorized person. Reportable unauthorized disclosure cases are those which involve the release and disclosure of classified information, either deliberate or inadvertent, as contrasted to physical security violations such as, for example, an unattended open safe, or the confirmed loss of control of a classified document. It includes, but is not limited to, unauthorized disclosure of classified informa-

tion in a newspaper, journal or other publication or any other communications media where such information is traceable to a Department because of a direct quotation, or other uniquely identifiable fact. The principal criteria for determining whether an unauthorized disclosure is reportable to the IC include both: (1) the release and disclosure are of sufficient importance to warrant formal investigation; and (2) the formal investigation confirms that an important disclosure did occur.

Instructions - Provide the following details concerning each incident:

1. Date the incident occurred, if known.
2. Subject and security classification of the compromised information and whether the information can be declassified.
3. Identify the document and the person or persons furnishing or disclosing the material, information or document (defined as any recorded information in any medium), if known.
4. Identify the publication (public press, technical journals, report, etc.) speech or briefing containing the unauthorized disclosure or the unauthorized recipient of the classified information.

5. Include the Department's (or Agency) evaluation of impact of the unauthorized disclosure on national security.
6. Indicate whether the unauthorized disclosure has been referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution, providing the names of probable defendants and the probable jurisdiction. In lieu of recommended legal action, indicate other action taken or pending.
7. Where appropriate, state action planned or taken to prevent similar disclosures or recurrences.
8. Attach additional sheets or exhibits as necessary.
9. Submit report on this form no later than twenty-one calendar days after the end of each quarter.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

During this reporting period two (2) unauthorized disclosures were reported to the Special Security Center, OS. Damage assessments were prepared in each instance for forwarding to the DCI and/or the Security Committee, NFIB.

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the intelligence data revealed by these disclosures, all background documents and damage assessment reports are being retained in the files of the Special Security Center and can be made available for ICRC review.

CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (Name, Title, Signature)

PERIOD ENDING (Day, Month, Year)

Executive Secretary

31 December 1977

STAT

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR MATERIAL
REPORT OF CLASSIFICATION ABUSES**

DEPARTMENT (or Agency)

Central Intelligence Agency

INTERAGENCY REPORT
CONTROL NO.

1223-GSA-QU

Definition—A classification abuse is an unnecessary classification, or an over or underclassification of a document; failure to assign the proper downgrading and declassification schedule; or improper application of classification markings.

It specifically applies to placing a document in an exempt declassification category except as provided by Executive Order 11652 and the NSC directive governing the classifica-

tion downgrading, declassification and safeguarding of National Security information. A classification abuse also includes any classification action by an individual not authorized in writing to exercise appropriate classification or exemption authority, or the improper delegation of such. Classification abuses becoming known during the reporting period (30 calendar days after the end of each calendar quarter) should be reported.

TYPE OF ABUSE	NUMBER OF ABUSES						TOTALS
	Corrected Immediately no further action necessary	WRITTEN NOTIFICATION			REPRIMAND		
		Letter of Instrms	Cautionary Letter	Formal notice	Oral	Admin.	
Classifying without authority							
Unnecessary classification							
Over-classification							
Failure to show classification authority							
Failure to apply Downgrading / Declassification							
Exempted without authority							
No internal classification markings used (Agencies where internal markings are mandatory)							
Improperly marked or stamped							
Other (Describe abuse)							
Other (Describe abuse)							
Other (Describe abuse)							
GRAND TOTALS							

REMARKS (Describe programs or actions taken during the report period to preclude classification abuses.)

Nothing to report.

CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (Name, title, signature)

Executive Secretary, CIA Information Review Committee

PERIOD ENDING (Day, month, year)

31 December 1977

20 March 1978

LESSONS LEARNED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

Number of Classifiers vs Number of Classification Actions

✓ The Central Intelligence Agency produces a certain amount of information in a given period of time that properly requires classification. The objective of reducing the number of classifiers is to help insure that only this truly classified information is marked as classified--by restricting classifying authority to officers who have the knowledge to determine proper classification. Once this level of classifying officers is reached, further reductions are counterproductive. Higher-level officers than appropriate are then required to make classification decisions, causing delays in processing information, as well as taking the officers' time away from their primary responsibilities. One problem in this area is the fact that we report our numbers of classifiers to ICRC, where they are put on graphs and in tables that indicate the "progress" made in reducing the level of classifiers. This is fine up to a point, but once the proper number of classifiers is reached, an agency "looks bad" by not continuing to reduce the level. This Agency has about reached our minimum level, and in the future our number of classifiers may remain nearly the same, or perhaps increase somewhat. We trust that such increases will not be highlighted as "lack of progress."

Limiting Exemption from GDS to Top Secret Classifiers

✓ A related problem is the requirement that only Top Secret classifiers have the authority to exempt information from automatic declassification under the General Declassification Schedule. This may be fine for an agency whose classified information is primarily of a nature such that relatively short, identifiable time frames can be established after which the information no longer requires protection, due to technological obsolescence, etc. The bulk of this Agency's information, however, is related to sources and methods which must be protected for extended--and sometimes indeterminate--periods of time. One result is that the Agency must delegate Top Secret classification authority in some cases solely for the purpose of exempting documents from automatic declassification. There are simply not enough hours in the day for the officers who are delegated Top Secret authority in order to approve Top Secret classifications to also approve all Agency exemptions. In addition, FOIA/PA/EO 11652 review officers require Top Secret authority to determine that the continued classification of denied information is proper. Again, this results in an inordinately high level of Top Secret classifiers appearing in the statistics we report to ICRC. Since the new Executive Order continues to tie these functions together, our numbers of Top Secret classifiers will continue to be inflated beyond our need for

classifying Top Secret documents. However, our intention for the future is to exempt documents where appropriate under classification guides approved by Top Secret classifiers, so that they will not have to approve individual classifications and exemptions below the Top Secret level.

Classification Guides

✓ As indicated above, the Agency's experience under EO 11652 has highlighted areas that can be improved through the use of classification guides. In addition, the development of these guides will be an excellent training experience for Agency employees. Over the years the thought and effort behind the rationale for individual classification decisions has varied, and there has been room for greater consistency in applying classification. The related requirement for protecting sources and methods information, which has been covered by GDS Exemption 2, can be spelled out in more detail in the classification guides. This should not only help classifiers, but also reviewers under the mandatory and systematic review provisions of the new Order, and FOIA/PA.

Paragraph Classification

The paragraph classification process required by EO 11652 has been useful. Paragraph classification encourages the classifier to think through classification decisions, rather than getting in the habit of applying classification automatically. It also facilitates declassification reviews under the Order and under FOIA/PA. In addition, paragraph classification should reduce the need to classify new documents containing extracts from classified documents, since the unclassified portions of the original documents are clearly marked.

Data Index

✓ The Data Index requirement of EO 11652 has been ineffective. It has not been possible to include all Agency classified documents in the index. Instead we have added certain classification and downgrading information to existing data bases. This has enabled us to comply with ICRC reporting requirements, but only on limited classes of information. Because of the volume of classified information produced by the Agency, we must project our statistical totals based on sampling techniques. This is done whether or not there is a "data index."

Reporting to ICRC

✓ It is useful to have a group such as ICRC to provide interagency coordination in the field of information security. Although the needs of this Agency diverge from those of other agencies at many points, we nevertheless have areas of common interest, particularly in procedures. One problem with ICRC monitoring of EO 11652 compliance has been in the area of statistical reporting. We realize that ICRC wishes to produce reports that show numerical comparisons among agencies and over periods of time. However, as mentioned above, certain of these

reported figures are subject to misinterpretation and are not truly reflective of "progress" achieved. We are encouraged by our understanding that ICRC is addressing the problem of reporting costs and effectiveness, and we trust that work will continue toward compiling statistics that are truly meaningful and that can be obtained at reasonable cost.

Systematic Classification Review

In compliance with the requirements of Executive Order 11652, the Agency officially began its 30-year systematic classification review of permanent records on 18 November 1977. This review is being conducted by the Records Review Branch (RRB) which is a centralized office made up of representatives from the four Directorates. In coordination with the various Agency offices RRB has been able to develop a set of declassification guidelines and to identify material to be reviewed. The main goals at this stage are to gain experience and expertise as well as increase actual production of the systematic review, which is already well underway. The Agency has provided considerable resources to meet the 30-year review requirement, and it is expected that these resources will have to increase substantially when the new 20-year review requirement becomes effective. In a related area the Agency, in coordination with the National Archives and Records Service, has been conducting a massive review, screening, and documentation of inactive records. In this process the Agency's non-permanent records are being segregated, so the 20-year classification review can be concentrated on truly permanent records.